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TRIBAL PREEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
When Indian tribal governments exercise their legal powers to oust
concurrent state jurisdiction over certain reservation activities,1 the
operative principle is called tribal preemption.2 The operation of tri-
bal preemption is in greatest dispute in matters involving non-Indians
because the courts are likely to find exclusive tribal and federal juris-
diction when only Indians are involved.3
Tribal preemption has and will continue to have a major economic
effect in Indian country. 4 Virtually all authorities agree that tribal
economic development is essential to the stability and growth of tribal
governments. 5 Economic development may, in turn, depend on the
availability of tribal preemption both to aid Indian projects by shel-
tering them from state taxation and regulation schemes and to ensure
that the tribes themselves will benefit from direct tax revenues.6
1. Conflicts between the distinct status of Indian tribes under federal law, and state
claims to sovereignty over lands within their borders, have bred much recent litigation.
See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978). Compare United States v. John, 98 S. Ct.
2541 (1978), McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). See generally STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEw COMM'N, 94TH CONG.,
2D SEss., REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 57-119 (Comm. Print
1976).
2. 'Tribal preemption" is here defined as the exclusion of concurrent state jurisdic-
tion by tribal action. This definition should be distinguished from the use of "tribal
preemption" in other articles to refer to the displacement by tribal action of general fed-
eral regulatory schemes. See Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Im-
pact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. CoLo. L. REV. 617, 635-52 (1976).
Cf. United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1368 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (suggesting that
tribal licensing should not alter general federal statutory scheme).
3. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
4. Indian country encompasses many categories of land. For an excellent review of
the materials relating to Indian country, see D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WIL-
KINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 348-57 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
5. E.g., Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and The Future of Tribal
Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1977); Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal
Jurisdiction to Tax Non-Indians, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 166, 166 n.2 (1976); Israel,
supra note 2, at 617, 633-35. See also Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening
of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977).
6. Tribes stand in need of direct tax revenues more than other local governments,
because reservation poverty keeps tribal tax bases painfully low. See S. LEVITAN & W.
JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING: FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 11 (1975). The
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An increasing number of tribes are opting for consumer-oriented
economic activities such as tourism and merchandising, involving
non-Indian as well as Indian customers. 7 Because these tribal busi-
nesses will involve non-Indian tourists, hunters, fishers, and consum-
ers, tribal regulation of, or participation in, particular reservation en-
terprises may raise the issue of tribal preemption of state jurisdiction
in situations that would otherwise be subject to concurrent state
jurisdiction.
Tribal taxation without preemption of the concurrent state tax,
however, imposes a double tax burden on reservation businesses,
placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 8 Exclusive tribal author-
ity to tax enables the tribes to provide the economic advantages neces-
sary to establish successful businesses in Indian communities which,
in turn, helps to combat reservation underdevelopment, isolation, and
high overhead costs. 9 Thus, in the absence of tribal preemption, tribes
may face a difficult dilemma: they must either forego tax programs
entirely, thereby depriving the tribe of needed revenue, or impose
taxes and thereby discourage the development of reservation busi-
nesses. 10
On the other hand, states will vigorously object to tribal preemp-
tion, raising significant issues. States stand to lose revenues from res-
ervation activities if their otherwise valid tax and licensing regulations
authors state that "Indian per capita income is only half that of whites.... Indian aver-
age [income] is below $1600 per year, the lowest among any ethnic group." Id. See
generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION
SUBJECT REPORTS: AMERICAN INDIANS (1973). If state regulatory authority is excluded,
profits as well as secondary revenues, such as tax dollars or license fees, will remain on
the reservations. This will benefit both Indian entrepreneurs and the tribes themselves.
7. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, No. 77-867 Phx. WPC (D.
Ariz., June 13, 1978) (tribal game regulations); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS 487 (1974)
(Warm Springs resort hotel); Menominee Tribal News, Oct. 1978, at 1, col. 2 (super-
market).
8. See Pre-Trial Order at 23, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978); Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 62.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
9. Barsh, supra note 5, at 46.
10. For example, in one case it was argued:
Since the volume of cigarettes sold by the tribal outlets to reservation Indians is
less than 10% of the total volume of cigarettes sold, it is highly unlikely that the tri-
bal tobacco outlets will be able to survive economically [under a multiple tax bur-
den]. Ultimately, the result will be that the plaintiff Tribes will no longer be able to
generate tax revenues. . ..
Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 62, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, v.
Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978). See generally Barsh, supra note 5.
634
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are excluded by tribal preemption. Furthermore, there are hard
questions about the fairness of Indian merchants inside reservation
boundaries taking sales dollars away from non-Indian merchants on
the other side of the boundaries because of the application of tribal
preemption.
This comment analyzes the sources for the tribal preemption doc-
trine and the application of the doctrine. Because preemption neces-
sarily involves a conflict between entities which seek to assert jurisdic-
tion over the same subject matter, the general contours of jurisdiction
over Indians must first be examined. The comment then discusses the
federal preemption doctrine in order to explain more fully the aspects
of tribal preemption which rest upon federal preemption. After an
examination of how tribal preemption is applied in various settings,
the comment will briefly look at the possibilities of partial tribal
preemption. Finally, the comment concludes that a two-step preemp-
tion analysis will allow Indian tribes the freedom from state actions
which is essential to tribal development.
II. CONTOURS OF INDIAN COUNTRY JURISDICTION
At the outset, the present allocation of Indian country jurisdiction
must be reviewed to determine the areas of potential concurrence be-
tween tribal and state subject matter jurisdictions, in order to identify
where the issues of tribal preemption might arise.
A. Criminal Jurisdiction
Recent Supreme Court cases have discussed extensively the param-
eters of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country exercised by the tribes,
national government, and states." Tribes retain authority to try and
punish their members, and probably other Indians, for criminal
acts.12 The Court, however, has held that tribes impliedly ceded juris-
diction over non-Indian criminals in the course of tribal relations with
the federal government. 13
The scope of Indian authority is affected by federal statutes. The
11. United States v. John, 98 S. Ct. 2541 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
12. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d
231 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191. The implications of Oli-
phant on the effective maintenance of reservation order are not clear. Cf. notes 92-100
and accompanying text infra (discussing enforcement problems concerning fish and
635
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United States has exercised authority over Indians who commit cer-
tain major crimes. Those crimes are enumerated in the Major Crimes
Act of 1885.14 The federal government also has authority over crimes
committed between Indians and non-Indians through the General
Crimes Act,15 except where authority has been delegated to the states
by statutes such as Public Law 280.16 It is unsettled whether tribes re-
tain concurrent jurisdiction over crimes by one Indian against another
in states which validly accepted such federal delegations of jurisdic-
tion.1 7
Finally, states have been held to exercise exclusive authority over
crimes by one non-Indian against another non-Indian in Indian coun-
try.18 Under present law, then, practical jurisdictional authority varies
with the identity of either the victim or the criminal. 19
B. Civil Jurisdiction
Although patterns of civil jurisdiction 20 over reservation lands and
activities may also vary to some extent depending on the races of the
parties involved, the general rule favors tribal civil authority over ac-
tivities and property within reservations 21 as well as in other areas
game violations on a reservation). Oliphant is discussed in detail in Collins. Implied
Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1979) (this vol-
ume).
14. 18U.S.C.§ 1153(1976).
15. ld.§ 1152.
16. Id. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976). See generally Comment, Washington's
Public Law 280 Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REV. 701 (1978).
17. Since federal jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act does not extend to in-
tra-Indian crimes or to crimes by Indians punished by tribal law, state exercise of dele-
gated criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280 arguably may not preempt concur-
rent tribal jurisdiction over such crimes. See, e.g., Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503, 540-50,
555-60, 569-70(1976).
18. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Cf. United States v. Ante-
lope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (discussing the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in McBrat-
ney and similar cases). Antelope clarifies the fact that crimes between non-Indians on
Indian reservations are within the permissible scope of federal jurisdiction, but that
section 1152 has been construed not to apply to such crimes, leaving them to state juris-
diction. 430 U.S. at 648 n.9.
19. Clinton, supra note 17, at 545.
20. See generally Dolan, State Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Mineral Activities on
Indian Reservations, 21 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 475 (1976); Goldberg, Public Law
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
535 (1975).
21. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973);
Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904). Salt River Project v. Navajo Tribe, No. 78-
352 (D. Ariz., July 11, 1978).
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protected by treaty22 or statute. 23 Unless Congress provides otherwise,
this rule applies to both legislative24 and judicial25 jurisdiction.
The major congressional statute altering this principle, known as
Public Law 28026 (P.L. 280), provided for the transfer of jurisdiction
to states over causes of action concerning reservation Indians.27 In
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,28 the Supreme Court
held that states may exercise regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian
purchases from a reservation tobacco dealer.29 The Court rejected the
state's attempts to tax tobacco sales to Indians and to regulate Indian
vehicles, but upheld the state's requirement that Indian vendors col-
lect state use taxes from non-Indian purchasers of tobacco products
and remit the amount collected to the state. The Court recognized
that the state had an interest in preventing its citizens from avoiding
the payment of "a concededly lawful tax" and commented that the
impact on internal tribal interests was "minimal."3 0
Moe presented the classic case of concurrent- state and tribal juris-
dictions. In this situation, non-Indians were involved with Indians in
reservation transactions. The tribe in Moe had not exercised its juris-
diction to tax cigarette sales to non-Indians. Had it done so, the issue
of tribal preemption would have been squarely posed.
III. TRIBAL POWERS IN FEDERAL AND TRIBALPREEMPTION
The doctrine of tribal preemption is similar, but not identical, to
the more familiar doctrine of federal preemption which operates in
22. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231.
23. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
24. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). See generally Gold-
berg, supra note 20. See also note 16 and accompanying text supra (criminal provisions
of Public Law 280).
27. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
28. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
29. See also Ute Indian Tribe v. State Tax Comm'n, 574 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 452 (1978).
30. 425 U.S. at 483. The economic effects of a state tax on reservation tobacco sales
to non-Indians may in fact be substantial. Barsh, supra note 5, at 28-32. Cigarette de-
mand is seen as highly "price elastic," that is, sales volume closely reflects current sell-
ing price. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F.
Supp. 1339, 1347 (E.D. Wash. 1978). Because of this, reservation dealers depend for a
substantial portion of their income on off-reservation non-Indians going out of their
way to buy cheaper cigarettes. If tribal taxation of such sales preempts concurrent state
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the field of Indian law. 31 Federal preemption virtually always applies
on Indian land when only Indians are involved. 32 Thus, the doctrine
of tribal preemption usually becomes important only when a tribe
seeks to eliminate state jurisdiction over non-Indians. It is useful to
examine the federal preemption doctrine and compare it to tribal
preemption to show the power and limits of tribal preemption.
A. The Source and Scope of Federal Preemption
The constitutional doctrine of federal preemption allows the fed-
eral government wholly or partially to oust otherwise valid state au-
thority. 33 Preemption may be either "express" or "implied." Implied
preemption is found when federal action in a particular subject matter
or area has been so comprehensive that state power would interfere
with the federal activity under the supremacy clause 34 of the federal
Constitution. Although the application of the preemption doctrine
varies according to the subject matter and specific statutes involved,
one commentary noted the Supreme Court's "disposition in favor of
the presumed validity of state regulations" 35 absent a clear indication
of contrary congressional intent.
This presumption in favor of the states, however, does not apply to
federal preemption in the area of Indian law. In fact, the standard
presumption is reversed in this area; 36 state regulations of Indians in
Indian country are presumed invalid unless Congress has clearly in-
tended to terminate the Indians' "special relation to the federal gov-
ernment from which the states are excluded. '37
The leading case, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commis-
sion,38 illustrates both the presumption of invalidity and the role of
tribal sovereignty in formulating the presumption. The McClanahan
Court, while refusing to allow a state to tax income earned by a reser-
vation Indian from reservation sources, summarized the impact of the
taxes, the probable outcome will be: (1) more cigarettes sold to non-Indians, increasing
revenue into the reservation, (2) tribes will be able to increase their own taxes, without
overburdening reservation business people. Tribal preemption may be the best way for
tribes to avoid the dilemma described in notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
31. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
32. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
33. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-404 (1978).
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
35. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 270 (1978).
36. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 299.
37. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).
38. 411 U.S. 164(1973).
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"deeply rooted" doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty.3 9 The Court
noted that the basic principle that state law could not operate within
reservation boundaries was modified in cases "'where essential tribal
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not
be jeopardized.' "40 The Court also noted that the trend of analysis
has been
away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state ju-
risdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption .... The modern
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sover-
eignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power.4 1
The Court nevertheless stated that "the Indian sovereignty doctrine is
relevant ... because it provides a backdrop against which the applica-
ble treaties and federal statutes must be read." 42 In fact, the role of
tribal sovereignty remains an important facet of federal preemption in
the area of Indian law, and McClanahan leaves open the possibility
that the preemptive act in Indian law cases may be the federal recog-
nition of tribal sovereignty itself,43 that is, governmental control over
a recognized territory, 44 and nothing more. 45
39. Id. at 168-7 1. The Court noted that "it would vastly oversimplify the problem
to say that nothing remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a separate people
to whom state jurisdiction... may not extend." Id. at 170.
40. Id. at 171 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959)).
41. 411 U.S. at 172 (citations omitted).
42. Id.
43. The preemptive act which the Court found to exclude state authority in McCla-
nahan was the Navajo Treaty of 1868, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667. The Court noted that
this treaty "was meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the
Navajos under general federal supervision," and "preclude [s] extension of state law-
including state tax law-to Indians on the Navajo Reservation." 411 U.S. at 175. The
Court also noted that subsequent statutes supported this conclusion. Id. at 175-79.
44. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 296-97. The Supreme Court has dis-
cussed tribal sovereignty only in the context of recognized tribes. See Puget Sound Gill-
netters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 277 (1978). There the court stated: "It is questionable whether Anglo-American con-
cepts of sovereignty existed in these Indian cultures.... The United States treated them
as tribes, however." Id. at 1127 n.2. It is at least arguable that tribes retain today three
aspects of sovereignty as it is defined by international law, that is, (1) governmental
control (2) of a defined population (3) in a defined territory. See, e.g., United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978), noted that tribes, in their early dealings with the federal government,
gave up a fourth element, the capacity for international relations. Id. at 209.
45. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963); Mettler, A Uni-
fied Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGs L. J. 89, 112-23, 136 (1978)
("federal laws may be. . . simply a recognition. . . of original tribal powers").
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The McClanahan Court, in articulating the controlling test for fed-
eral Indian law preemption issues, rejected extremes on both sides.
The first of these extremes, here called the "strict preemption" view,
denies "the existence of inherent tribal sovereignty." 46 Consequently,
preemption of state law could not be accomplished by recognizing
such sovereignty. This approach ignores the special sovereign status
of Indian tribes in America and has not been followed by the Court.47
The other extreme, which might be termed the "automatic preemp-
tion" analysis, argues that tribes retain their sovereign power to ex-
clude state authority over areas of tribal interest without the involve-
ment of the federal government. This view ignores the dynamics of
federalism and was foreclosed by the Court in a footnote in Moe.48
The tradition of tribal sovereignty remains a vital element of Indian
federal preemption issues. 49 As a consequence, preemption may result
from a statute which is extremely broad,50 or the enactment of tribal
regulations pursuant to a congressional delegation of legislative power
to Indian tribes as governments. 51
B. The Source and Scope of Tribal Preemption
The direct source of tribal power to preempt concurrent state juris-
diction is not constitutional in character. The source may be defined
as one of either "delegation" or "recognition." The "delegation" per-
46. Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: In-
herent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 600, 634-35 (1976). See
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Brief for the
State of South Dakota, et al., as Amici Curiae at 7-10, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See also Brief for Amicus Curiae Attorney General, State
of Washington at 27, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See
generally notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra (standard federal preemption anal-
ysis).
47. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In Oliphant, the Supreme Court did not question the
existence of the tribe's inherent sovereignty; the Court simply found that tribal sover-
eignty had been limited. See also Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist.
Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978).
48. 425 U.S. at 481 n.17. The Court made it clear that Indian preemption was not a
matter of intergovernmental immunity or other "automatic" constitutional exemption,
but an issue of federalism. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
49. See, e.g., Wauneka v. Campbell, 22 Ariz. App. 287, 526 P.2d 1085, 1086-87
(1974).
50. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963). See generally Pelcy-
ger, supra note 5.
51. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547-49 (1975).
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spective views tribal preemption as the exercise of expressly or im-
pliedly delegated federal power.52 Under this view, the powers
delegated to the Indians by Congress may be considered the compre-
hensive federal action which preempts the states' jurisdiction over that
subject matter.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mazurie53 may
support the use of the delegation doctrine. In Mazurie, the Court
upheld an explicit congressional delegation of legislative authority to
an Indian tribe to regulate liquor sales on the reservation, because
tribes possess independent authority over subject matters affecting
tribal life. However, because the tribal action was taken pursuant to a
federal local option statute directed at the control of reservation li-
quor traffic and the holding was one of federal, not tribal, preemp-
tion.54
The "recognition" analysis, on the other hand, regards tribal sover-
eignty as the source of tribal regulatory authority and as a doctrine
subtly different from federal delegation. 55 The distinction is this: fed-
eral delegation operates in connection with affirmative legislative
action which confers certain federal powers on tribes. Recognition
simply acknowledges the existence of tribal sovereignty and it is this
sovereignty which supports tribal preemption. The federal actions
which support recognized tribal sovereignty, however, normally
would also support a finding of implied delegation.
Fisher v. District Court56 is an example of a case which may be
viewed as either a "delegation" or a "recognition" case. The Supreme
Court in Fisher rejected an assertion of state court jurisdiction over an
adoption proceeding involving only tribal members who were resi-
dents of the reservation. Such asserted state authority was held to in-
terfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court.5 7 The state of
Montana argued that it should have at least concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter because the state courts exercised jurisdiction over tri-
bal adoptions before the organization of the tribe in 1935. Assuming
without deciding that Montana's initial assertion of.jurisdiction was
52. Tribal preemption, in other words, would be an extreme example of implied
preemption, which might be appropriate in the context of the federal trust responsibility
for Indians. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975). Ninth Circuit cases have adopted the "delega-
tion" view. See notes 60-64 & 117-19 and accompanying text infra.
53. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
54. Id. at 557.
55. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
56. 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam).
57. Id.-at 386-89.
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proper,58 the Court said that the tribal ordinance establishing tribal
adoption powers "implements an overriding federal policy" preempt-
ing state jurisdiction .59
The Court in Fisher stated that the tribal ordinance which con-
ferred jurisdiction on the tribe's court "was authorized by" 60 the In-
dian Reorganization Act 61 (I.R.A.). The delegation of federal power
under the I.R.A. was, however, only implicit. In Fisher, the tribal law
upheld set up the tribe's court system, an objective directly in line
with the purpose of the I.R.A.-to "encourage Indian ... self-govern-
ment."62
The Fisher Court also discussed at length the tribal right of self-
government, which was "protected by federal statute"63 long before
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. The court did not discuss
whether the relevant federal statutes and agreements recognize exist-
ing tribal powers and protect them by federal authority, or whether
they constitute an implied delegation of federal powers to the tribe.
Either viewpoint seems consistent with the Court's remark in another
context that " [t] he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not
derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sover-
eign status of the [tribe] under federal law."6 4
Whether "recognized" tribal or "delegated" federal preemption is
involved in a particular case will depend on a careful assessment of
the facts. In both analyses, state authority is preempted under the su-
premacy clause by the federal government's action, whether that ac-
tion is one of delegation or of recognition.
Although these two perspectives can thus often produce similar or
58. Id. at 390.
59. Id. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
60. 424 U.S. at 390.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
62. 424 U.S. at 387.
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id. at 390. Thus, Fisher is consistent with United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978), regarding the relationship between the I.R.A. and residual tribal sover-
eignty. Wheeler carefully pointed out that the Navajo Tribe's exercise of criminal juris-
diction over a tribal member derived from a sovereignty separate from that of the fed-
eral government's, and was not delegated by the Reorganization Act or other statutes.
In Wheeler, the basic question was whether the tribe had inherent authority to control its
populace. The Court so held. In Fisher, the issue was a conflict between state and tribal
jurisdiction over the same subject matter. The Court recognized exclusive tribal
jurisdiction and noted this was federally protected by such statutes as the I.R.A. 424
U.S. at 386-87. It was not enough to recognize the tribe's authority; the Court had to de-
cide in Fisher whether state authority' was excluded. This question was not present in
Wheeler. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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identical results, the difference between the two approaches may be
crucial to tribal development and stability over the long run. The
"recognition" analysis can result in a wider range of tribal preemptive
powers as well as increase the extent of preemption in a particular
case.6 5 More significantly, recognition of a tribe's governmental juris-
diction means that the tribe can assert its legitimate interests in a par-
ticular subject matter without the need for a specific delegation of fed-
eral authority.
Notwithstanding the different sources of the tribe's power to
preempt state action, a basic factor in many preemption cases seems
not to be doctrinal but rather economic-the degree to which concur-
rent state jurisdiction has had an adverse impact on the economic
condition of the tribes involved.66 These cases often revolve around
the economic interests in taxation and in hunting and fishing.
1. Taxation of non-Indians
One basic issue of concurrent state and tribal concern is the taxa-
tion of certain non-Indian activities within Indian reservations. r7 In
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washing-
ton68 (Confederated Tribes 1) a divided 69 three-judge district court70
held that tribal taxation of on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-In-
dians, pursuant to a federal delegation, preempted state taxation of
the same transactions. The court found also that state taxation of tri-
bally taxed cigarette sales would interfere with tribal self-government
by creating severe economic effects on tribal programs and reve-
65. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text infra.
66. One exception is Fisher. See notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra. Eco-
nomic issues were not involved in Fisher; the underlying controversy was an adoption
proceeding. Whether the preemption involved was federal or tribal in nature was un-
clear; because the case did not involve non-Indian interests, it would normally give rise
to federal preemption. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State TaxComm'n, 411 U.S.
164 (1973).
67. State and tribal interests are deeply divided in the taxation area. STAFF OF
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SSs., REPORT ON RESERVA-
TION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 65 (Comm. Print 1976). Cf. R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 509 (1977) ("Each state has an incentive to impose
taxes the burden of which fall, so far as possible, on [non-residents] .").
68. 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (three-judge court), appeal docketed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. July 10, 1978) (No. 78-60).
69. Circuit Judge Kilkenny filed an opinion in which he concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. 446 F. Supp. at 1374.
70. The statute providing for three-judge panels has been repealed. Act of Aug. 12,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-384, § 4, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
643
Washington Law Review
nues.71 In fact, these two grounds for decision, although looking alter-
natively to the "delegation" and "recognition" rationales for tribal
preemption, are related.72
Confederated Tribes 1 seems to stand for the principle that al-
though the business enterprises of tribal corporations off the reserva-
tion do not enjoy automatic exemption from state tax burdens,7 3
tribes as governments which would suffer directly from taxes affecting
tribal business conducted on the reservation74 are immune from such
taxation.
In Confederated Tribes 1, the majority distinguished Moe75 and
Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino,76 which had upheld
state taxation of non-Indian activities and interests despite indirect ef-
fects on Indian businesses. Moe, as discussed, concerned a use tax on
non-Indian purchases of tobacco from a reservation dealer. Fort Mo-
jave Tribe involved a tax imposed by a state on non-Indian lessees of
Indian lands, even though the Fort Mojave Tribe had imposed a tax
of its own on the non-Indian lessees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals sustained the state leasehold tax, finding that it was neither
expressly preempted nor an infringement on tribal self-government,
noting that "[t] he location of ultimate economic benefits and burdens
of the tax in question is quite uncertain. '77 The Confederated Tribes
1 majority saw a "crucial factual difference" 78 between the situation
in Fort Mojave and the substantial evidence of financial impact on
the tribe present in Confederated Tribes 1. The Confederated Tribes
were dependent upon taxation revenues for their very existence. The
state tax could not coexist with the tribe's tax without seriously injur-
ing or destroying the tax base-enterprises located on the reservation.
The ultimate burden of the state tax would fall squarely on tribes.79
Confederated Tribes 1 looked to Fisher for guidance in finding tri-
71. 446 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
72. See generally Barsh, supra note 5.
73. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 463; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973).
74. For example, the pre-trial order in Confederated Tribes 1 reflected the plain-
tiffs' undisputed claims that they were all substantially, and some entirely, dependent on
tax revenue for the operation of tribal programs. Pre-Trial Order, Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
75. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
76. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
77. Id. at 1257 n.4. See id. at 1255 n.2, 1258.
78. 446 F. Supp. at 1364.
79. See notes 8 & 71-74 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 363 (1949) ("merely theoretical conceptions of interference
with the functions of government" not enough to restrict otherwise valid state tax).
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bal preemption of state jurisdiction and adopted the implied delega-
tion analysis.80 Mazurie was also cited by the court in Confederated
Tribes 1 to support use of the delegation doctrine.81 Nevertheless, it
may be argued that neither Mazurie nor Fisher directly supports the
conclusion that the I.R.A. authorized the tribal legislative powers in
Confederated Tribes 1. In Mazurie, the delegation was express. In
Confederated Tribes 1, the tribal tax did not refer to an express dele-
gation of congressional authority; in fact, the Confederated Tribes 1
court specifically found that federal preemption did not apply.82 Like-
wise, although Fisher can be regarded as upholding an implicit dele-
gation of federal power under the I.R.A., the case is distinguishable
from Confederated Tribes 1. In Fisher, the tribal court system was an
objective supported by the I.R.A. policy to encourage tribal self-gov-
ernment. The tribal taxes in Confederated Tribes I are arguably a less
essential governmental function than the establishment of a judici-
ary.8 3
There are two responses to the distinctions between the cases. First,
there may be no difference in effect between express and implied fed-
eral delegation, just as there is none between express and implied
federal preemption.8 4 Here, it is useful to compare: (1) Express dele-
gation (Mazurie); (2) implied delegation of an intrinsic governmental
function (Fisher); and (3) implied delegation of a supportive govern-
mental function (Confederated Tribes 1). All three levels of delega-
tion are well within the federal power to effect its trust relationship85
with Indian tribes.
Second, the express/implied argument can be avoided by focusing
on the "recognition" analysis of Fisher.86 From this perspective, the
federal acts which protect tribal government in Fisher recognized in-
herent tribal authority to exercise jurisdiction.87 Under this view,
Congress did nothing to delegate, it merely expressed its intent that
Indian sovereignty continue. Similarly, the tribal taxation in
Confederated Tribes 1 can be regarded as the exercise, not of feder-
80. 446 F. Supp. at 1360-61.
81. Id. at 1360.
82. Id. at 1358-60.
83. See id. at 1374 (Kilkenny, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
85. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
86. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
87. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) (reaffirming "all powers vested in any Indian tribe
or tribal council by existing law").
645
Washington Law Review
ally delegated power, but of tribal sovereignty. 88 Using this analysis,
the federal actions with respect to Indian tribes via federal agree-
ments, executive orders, and statutes such as the I.R.A. are potentially
preemptive, without necessarily delegating legislative authority. 89
2. Regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing
The on-reservation regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing is
another area where state and tribal interests conflict.9 0 As tribes con-
tinue to grow in strength and sophistication, 9' the principles of tribal
preemption might play an increasing role in the solution of jur-
isdictional disputes in this field.
In Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe92 (Quechan Tribe 1), the fed-
eral district court upheld the right of tribal authorities to regulate on-
reservation hunting and fishing, even among non-Indians, despite fed-
eral delegation to the state of most criminal and some civil jurisdic-
tion over hunting and fishing. 93 The district court enjoined state
interference with tribal actions intended to enforce such regulations,
commenting that "[i] f there is a conflict between an Indian law and a
state law, the state law is unenforceable on Indian land."9 4 On appeal,
88. See Salt River Project v. Navajo Tribe, No. 78-352, (D. Ariz., July 11, 1978).
Cf. Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan, No. R-2888 (D. Nev., Dec. 14, 1973) (order
granting preliminary injunction). There the court considered as a matter of federal law
"the rights and sovereignty of Indians vis-a-vis the states particularly with regard to
state taxation of Indian activities." Id. at 6.
89. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
90. In Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Comm'n, the court stated:
Each case of state regulation of on-reservation hunting and fishing is unique, and
the extent to which the state may regulate such activity necessarily depends upon
such factors as the tribal constitution and its powers to regulate such activity; the
character of the animals involved, whether migratory or stationary; the nature of
the waters involved, whether streams or major tributaries; and the varying state in-
terests in the regulation of on-reservation activity by non-Indians. Granted these
variables, the courts have reached different results in cases concerning the reach of
state regulatory laws onto reservations.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588
F.2d 75, 79 n.3 (4th Cir. 1978).
91. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 5; Israel, supra note 2; Pelcyger, supra note 5.
92. 350 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 531 F.2d 408 (1976).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). See generally Goldberg,
supra note 20. Cf. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976) (requiring tribal consent to further
federal delegations of reservation jurisdiction to the states, and providing a procedure
for state retrocession of reservation jurisdiction to the federal government).
94. 350 F. Supp. at 109.
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the tribe's right to regu-
late reservation hunting and fishing, noting that the tribe had "inher-
ent power to exclude non-members." 95 However, the court construed
the tribal constitution as disclaiming criminal jurisdiction over non-
members. 96 This decision left the tribe with the civil power to regulate
hunting and fishing, but with only limited power to enforce its
regulations.
In another context, the district court in California v. Quechan
Tribe of Indians97 (Quechan Tribe 2) allowed California to apply
prohibitory fish and game laws to non-Indians on the reservation,
finding that the economic effect of such application "is too minimal to
require a different result," and that no other tribal interests would be
infringed. 98 However, because the tribe refused to admit state game
wardens to enforce the regulations, the court recognized that it could
not overturn the tribal decision without directly interfering with tribal
"power to govern reservation affairs." 99 Thus, a certain amount of
state jurisdiction over the subject was recognized, but the state had lit-
tle means to enforce its regulations. 100
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Department
of Natural & Economic Resources'01 involved a similar situation. The
tribe sought a declaration that state collection of fishing license fees
from non-Indians on the Eastern Cherokee Reservation infringed
upon the tribal right to self-government and the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States. As amicus curiae, the United States argued that
state jurisdiction had been federally preempted. 10 2 The state, relying
on the "unique history" of the Eastern Band,'0 3 contended that con-
current state jurisdiction over the reservation existed, accurately
pointing out that no express preemption by federal laws had occurred.
95. 531 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 411.
97. 424 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
98. Id. at 976.
99. Id.
100. See also Donahue v. California Justice Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 557, 564, 93
Cal. Rptr. 310, 315, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 990 (1971) (tribal permission to fish on reser-
vation provides a defense for a non-Indian to state criminal prosecution under Fish and
Game Code).
101. No. BC-C-76-65 (W.D.N.C., Aug. 27, 1976), aff'd, 588 F.2d 75 (1978).
102. No. BC-C-76-65, slip op. at 1.
103. Id. at 3-6. See generally United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 193 1),
cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1932). Cf. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (up-
holding federal status of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, which has had history
similar to that of the Eastern Band).
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The court, however, found that the tribal Fish and Game Manage-
ment Program provided a comprehensive regulatory scheme over
Qualla Boundary hunting and fishing "under congressional authority
and approval,"' 104 thus preempting state regulation of the area. 105 The
court also noted that the economic welfare of the Eastern Band was
dependent on its income from the fishing program and related tour-
ism106-a fact distinguishing this case from Moel07 but closely relat-
ing Eastern Band to Confederated Tribes 1.108
The court in Eastern Band found a federal delegation of regulatory
authority and federal preemption flowing from the tribe's regulatory
scheme. 109 There may be few legal distinctions arising from the spe-
cial circumstances of the Eastern Band's history" o to distinguish its
present status from such treaty-protected tribes as the Navajos."' On
the other hand, a finding of federal delegation of legislative authority,
while probably appropriate in such cases as Eastern Band, might not
be factually accurate in other situations.' 1 2
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Wash-
ington1 13 (Confederated Tribes 2) illustrates this point. The tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation sought a declaratory judgment that
Washington had no legal right to regulate fishing within the reserva-
tion, whether by Indians or non-Indians." 4 The district court first dis-
cussed "the exclusive right [of Indians] to hunt and fish on lands re-
served to them." 115 The court went on to conclude that state
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation was preempted by the
enactment of a comprehensive tribal program to control the reserva-
tion fishery" 6 pursuant to the regulatory authority over hunting and
104. No. BC-C-76-65, slip op. at 9.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 10-11.
107. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
109. No. BC-C-76-65, slip op. at 9.
110. See note 103 supra.
11I. See note 43 supra. Cf. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (exercise by Navajo
Tribe of criminal jurisdiction regarded as the action of a sovereign separate from the
federal government); Salt River Project v. Navajo Tribe, No. 78-352 Phx. WPC (D.
Ariz., July 11, 1978) (power to tax inherent in Navajo sovereignty, not delegated by the
federal government).
113. 412 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Wash. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. 412F.Supp.at651.
115. Id.at654.
116. Id.at 655.
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fishing delegated to the tribes in a proviso to P.L. 280."1 That pro-
viso exempted control over certain Indian hunting and fishing rights
from the grant of jurisdiction to the state.
The proviso relied on by the court may be construed as an implied
delegation of power to the tribes. This proviso, however, merely said
that nothing in P.L. 280 would "deprive any Indian or any Indian
tribe" of hunting and fishing rights secured by federal treaty, agree-
ment or statute. 118 This simply reaffirmed the status quo. The
Confederated Tribes already hiad the right to regulate fishing on their
reservation when P.L. 280 was passed: the court's finding of a federal
delegation of power to do so was probably unnecessary unless P.L.
280 simultaneously deprived the tribe of jurisdiction and delegated
back a portion of its powers.' 1 9
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
ruling. 2 0 The appellate court appeared to rely on the district court's
doctrine of delegation, though the issue was never directly addressed.
The appellate court decided that "the tribal couricil's own scheme" al-
lowed the "'dual state-federal jurisdiction' that ... Congress had in-
tended.' 21 The indicia of tribal intent relied upon to reach this con-
clusion were, as pointed out by the dissent,122 less than compelling. In
addition, if the preemption analysis of this case had followed that of
other leading Indian law cases, the result might well have differed.
The court began its reasoning with the general rule that concurrent
state regulations "should not lightly be invalidated"' 23 in federal
preemption cases. However, the court ignored the fact that this pre-
sumption is reversed in the area of Indian law.'24 No reason was given
117. 18 U.S.C. § I 162(b) (1976).
118. Id.
119. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra. The court's finding of federal
delegation of enforcement authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1165 was perhaps more to the
point. See Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976). But see White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, No. 77-867 Phx. WPC, slip op. at 4 (D. Ariz., Sept. 6,
1978).
120. 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979). The appellate court limited its holding to the con-
clusion that there was an insufficiently clear manifestation of intent to preempt the state
regulations. Id. at 92-93 n.5. The court expressly did not decide whether tribal action
could preempt state jurisdiction. Id. at 92-93.
121. Id. at 92.
122. Id. at 93-94 (Duniway, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 91.
124. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra. Tribes would argue that tribal
regulation of non-Indians and their interests is entitled to the reversal of presumptions
because of the significant tribal interests involved in such regulation. States might con-
tend that the standard preemption analysis is appropriate in such cases because non-In-
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and none was apparent why this reversal should not apply to situa-
tions in which tribal actions preempt state jurisdiction. Such a rever-
sal of presumptions seems consistent both with the "recognition"
doctrine of tribal powers and the "delegation" doctrine. At any rate,
one message of Confederated Tribes 2 is clear: tribes need to take
pains to make their actions either comprehensive or explicitly
preemptive in order to persuade courts to uphold tribal efforts to oust
concurrent state jurisdiction over reservation affairs.
3. Partial v. total preemption
A partial preemption doctrine may or may not satisfy tribal and
state jurisdictional needs. In Quechan Tribe 2, state regulation of
non-Indian hunting and fishing on the Fort Yuma Reservation was
found not to be preempted. 125 State controls on non-Indian activities
were stricter than the tribe required. The court reasoned that no tribal
interest such as conservation was thereby infringed, "other than the
possible revenues generated by the sale of [tribal] permits to hunt or
fish where such hunting and fishing is limited" by state law.126 By
analogy, it may be argued in cases of tribal preemption that concur-
rent state authority should be preempted only to the extent that it does
not exceed tribal jurisdiction.
For example, a state cigarette tax might be preempted only to the
extent it does not exceed the simultaneous tribal tax. The difference
between the higher state tax and the tribal tax would be collectible by
the state. This situation may be compared to the Winters doctrine, by
which state access to river water is preempted only insofar as it inter-
feres with the federal purposes of reserving water for Indian use.' 27
Partial preemption might protect significant state concerns in a par-
ticular subject matter where concurrent tribal interests are limited.
In some circumstances, however, the doctrine of partial preemp-
tion can lead to difficulties. For example, the tribes involved in both
Confederated Tribes 1 and Eastern Band were shown to be directly
dependent on revenues derived from the activities which the respec-
tive states sought to regulate.' 28 The imposition of additional state
dians and their interests are being regulated. Compare notes 29-32 and accompanying
text supra with note 66 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
126. 424 F. Supp. at 975.
127. See Pelcyger, supra note 5, at 22-23.
128. See note 74 supra & note 106 and accompanying text supra. See also Eastern
Band, 588 F.2d at 77.
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taxes or fees in such situations, especially when affecting markets of
high price-elasticity, "would have a direct impact upon the finances of
the Tribe." 129 This impact would seriously interfere with the federal
purpose to protect tribal self-government. State assertions of reserva-
tion jurisdiction leading to such interferences have been totally
preempted even in cases where the affected tribes had not yet acted to
regulate the subject in question at least when the state had not at-
tempted to assume jurisdiction under P.L. 280.130 The Supreme
Court will likely be reluctant to apply only partial preemption to such
situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental drama of Indian law continues to be whether In-
dian tribes will vanish by assimilation into American society or re-
main legally and culturally apart.' 31 Tribal ability to make reserva-
tions economically viable will play a major role in this drama. Tribes
have felt compelled to develop their reservations, but often have
lacked the technical expertise, capital, or necessary federal adminis-
trative support.132 Recurring jurisdictional disputes between states
and tribes over the regulation of reservation resources have inhibited
the growth of tribal governments and have led to substantial confu-
sion.133 This uncertainty has been detrimental to state and tribal effi-
ciency.
This lingering controversy may be largely resolved by analyzing
reservation jurisdictional issues in two steps. First, it is necessary to
inquire whether federal preemption has precluded state subject matter
jurisdiction over the people and property involved. For example,
McClanahan found that a state tax on an Indian's reservation income
was federally preempted because of the comprehensive federal protec-
tion of the internal autonomy of the Navajo Tribe. 34 When an at-
tempted state regulation will interfere with tribal self-government,
129. Eastern Band, No. BC-C-76-65, slip op. at II. See also note 30 supra.
130. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
See generally Pelcyger, supra note 5.
131. Compare Martone, supra note 46, with Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of
the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
132. See STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 1-2, 10-
I (Comm. Print 1976).
133. See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d
1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978).
134. See notes 38-48 and accompanying text supra.
651
Washington Law Review
state jurisdiction may be subject to federal preemption from the out-
set. 135 As noted earlier, federal preemption will almost always apply
where exclusively Indian interests are involved.
Second, in the limited but important areas where state and tribal
authority does apply concurrently to reservation affairs, tribal
preemption may become relevant. Application of tribal preemption
can be a useful means of clarifying jurisdictional uncertainties. In
areas of marginal tribal concern some tribes may welcome state juris-
diction, though experience generally has been to the contrary. 136 In
areas of significant tribal interest, tribal preemption through involve-
ment in or regulation of the subject matter would allow tribal govern-
ments to carry out their functions free of state interference, and thus
derive substantial and needed economic benefits. In this way, tribal
preemption can play a major role in the contemporary renaissance of
American Indian life. 137
Eric R. Biggs*
135. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
136. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 212-13 (1973); Goldberg, supra
note 20, at 544-51.
137. See Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bu-
reaucracy, 62 YALE LJ. 348 (1953). Cohen states: "Like the miner's canary, the Indian
marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treat-
ment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and
fall in our democratic faith." Id. at 390.
* B.A., 1974, Amherst College; J.D., 1979, University of Oregon; Staff Research
Assistant for 1979 revision of Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. The as-
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